on the flip side to your comment, we're also concerned that russia may be helping the dprk in a range of areas, including surface to air missiles, production equipment for ballistic missiles or materiel or other advanced technologies. and so we have to keep a very close eye on this and connecting the dots to the u.n. security council, it was extremely unhelpful that the russian federation veto the resolution to maintain the independent panel of experts on sanctions implementation. and, oh, by the way, china didn't help either by abstaining from that. and china could also do a lot more to enforce those sanctions, so could say a lot more on that. but just to say it is something we keep a very close eye on and it is concerning that we're now talking about north korean missiles being used by russia against ukraine.chard, i want tr your service to the to the nation and to the alliance, and thank you for taking the time to be with us today. really appreciate it. thanks so much for having me.

i wish i could stay longer. if the next panel, that'd be great. good afternoon. welce to the private public session on the empowering. the u.s. are a key alliance at the nexus of security and economy. my name is ellen kim, deputy director and senior fellow with the korea chair. here is usaf. we have a very distinguished panel of speaker from korea and the united states and it is my great honor to introduce each of them. first, on my left is ambassador mooney lee, the senior executive director at the institute of foreign affairs and national security at the korea national . prior to that, he mostly recently served as a secretary to the president.

president yoon for foreign affairs at the office of national security and basically joined the ministry of foreign affairs in 1996 and served in various distinguished position, including the director of north korea nuclear affairs negotiation division, north korea, nuclear affairs bureau, minister of foreign affairs and trade and principal advisor to foreign minister and among others. sitting next to him is dr. victor cha, senior vice president for asia and korea. chair, fcc office. he's also distinct university professor and professor of government in the department of government and foreign service at georgetown university. he formerly served on the white house national security council and deputy head of allegation for the united states at the six party talks. of seven books and currently serving on the defense board in an advisory role to th■e secretary funds. next is dr. jiang yu, senior specialist at the center for economy, security and foreign affairs, which is an in-house research associate research unit, administrative affairs in

korea. she is a her research is focusing on policy x nexus among trade security, technology and strategic implication for the economy security. previously, she a research associate research fellow at the science and technology policy d visiting researcher at georgetown university law center. last, but certainly not least, emily benson is a director of a project on trade and technology and senior fellow. the short hearing that international business at the csis, where she focus on trade and investment technology issues. so we really have a really wonderful group today to talk about how to empower the u.s. okay, alliance at the nexus of economy and security. and so given that, ambassador lee, you serve in the, you know, in government for the with you maybe asking you and maybe dr. cha, for your initial assessment, brief

assessment on the current state of play in the u.s., i would can alliance. and then i would like to ask your thoughts on how we should how the alliance can deal with the, you know, a lot of challenges that we face today, such as north korea's, you know, balloon balloons and, you know, its increasing cooperation with russia, you know, u.n. security council is floundering and, you know, the tensions on the taiwan strait and also so the floor is yours. thank you. thank you for your kind instruction introduction. yeah, i think as a as a practitioner and a policy practitioner, it's better for me to focus on the kind of basic thoughts on theestions that you raised as a tee up for further discussions by the all the doctors live to me see as they are in in the previous session, the resrcout all the ws that he's doing now and in as a

practitioner, i was served for, i think analyst for different administrations and current government and the one of the most important job is to help find the right words to describe the status of a rogue us alliance and then the future direction of it's like a u.s. president has always tried to find the right word for this. his state of the union address, the status of the union. so i think the when i first joined the governmenpopular wore korea u.s. alliance is to no daylight between the two countries because at that time, the most of the important issues between the two countries are of course, dealing with north korea's nuclear threats and, you know, when the president, kim jong il, took office, there was some policy changes in in in the

part of the south korea, which may give us some some consternation in the u.s. part. so since then, there was always a growing importance for to to stress the i of close coordination and cooperation regarding the north korean policies. but that is not always the case. since then, we have in as some turbulent histories, some more. i think to your thesis experts currently serving in the high level officers in the state like a king and queen in as th lonely castle as well t so at that time in early 2000, the kind v that the we need toe our alliances upgrade means by strengthening and making an enduring alliance. i think nowadays it's always kind of a cornerstone to

describe alliance systems that allowed that that that words is expanding and the meaning of that that words is now or deepened and also strengthened. and now it's the key crystallize in word is institutionalizing the alliance. so what we are doing the institutionalized i think i think the most important example of that institutionalization is though, of course, in the military side, the nuclear consultative groups key and also economic, economic and security dialog, which is a lunch it i think than a year ago between the korea and then the united states. also there's now even a few weeks ago, the vice ministers of korea, japan and the united states that they are talking about developing parameters for the search mechanism to coordinating trilateral cooperation. that's the clear examples of how to is how we are■u working to institutionalize the alliance systems. then these kind of changes,

these kind of expanding the alliance and the key words, a correct snapshot of what we are doing, then what brings those kind of changes? i think there is a and listen to things shared by the post government that the first one is a recognition we are in a totally different world. the international order that we are taking for granted for the past seven years has crumbled towards one in the european continent. the other one is the middle east is engaged and the north korea, regardless of that 11 the security council resolution is the developing. you continue to developing nuclear weapons at the same time, the demarcation line between the traditional and traditional blurred security issues, non-security issues combined and even in the economic session, in economic area, the industrial policy to

which is adopted by the developing countries now is a can widely popular among the even the developed countries, including the united states. all these kind of traditional wisdom is challenged, and that uncertainty give us a great room to think about what we can do about the future. so based on that recognition, as the director, former director kim jung rightly point out, we need a template. we need the template led by the united states to cope with the challenges proposed by ttuncerts proposed by the uncertainties. in the team play, what kind of role can the republic of south korea play? that is an important moment that we need to think about the future of the alliancekorea allf its production capabilities and

military and kapok and all of the entertainm industries all of a sudden became a mega shopping mall for the developed western countries. we hava well-developed at the same time, a lot of people come to seoul and enjoy entertainment and food and all of those things. must-see places to help with technological advances and at the same time enjoy all those kinds of different things, and with those different recognitions, what we can do about the future. that is the third point that we can think about. the third one is based on these two recognitions, the government

tried to republish the foreign policies. the chancellor in his recent article, he described it as anchored possibility. we have more clarity, strategic clarity in terms of what belongs to democracy and freedom. we believe. at the same time, we have flexibility to engage with other important partners, china, russia. it is like we are trying to have our version of alliances to have security, to have our security confirmed, and at the time, deter future aggressions.

the trilateral corporation and the initiative, corporation with nato memberships, those are the important accomplishments by the administration. the summit with the pacific island countries last year, in the first ever summit with an african state. institutionalized efforts complement the efforts separate from previous administrations. through the process, the place in this world will be more secure as partners which like-minded countries can work with securing economy and technology and entertainment. thank you. ellen:ou. doctor? >> so let me just sort of build

what moon hee lee said. it is a pleasure to share the stage with you. every time i s part of those delegations coming to washington, d.c., with living in a time to talk. so it is good to see you here. if we look at the security bilaterally, the u.s. and the r.o.k. are doing quite well as richard johnson said a few minutes ago in terms of the extended deterrence work, the exercising, information sharing that is taking place. it is unprecedented so it is all doing well. you layer on top of that the improvements in the bilateral and trilateral relations, not a lot a people paid attention,ut the sidelines of the shangri-la meetings last week, japan reached an agreement on

basically defense normalization after a semi-hostile encounter that happened a few years ago between their vessels at sea. they worked out an agreement on sort of rules of engagement. it was not something that got a lot of attention. but a very substantive, significant thing that came out of that meeting that further sort of improves and cementstrii think that is all going very well. as ipr mentioned in my questiono richard, one of the big challenges is dprk denuclearization, but what is bigger is the relationship between the dprk and russia. the u.s. government has said over 1000 shipping containers of north korean munions have made their way to russia. the south korean ministry of defense said 3.5 million rounds

of ammunition from north korea is going to russia. russia of course produces its own ammunition, but they use more ammunition than they produce on a monthly basis, so the likely source for that deficit for the foreseeable future as long as the war continues in ukraine will be north korea. there were parts of missiles from north korea found in ukraine. they are selling ammunitions and missiles to russia, which are now killing europeans in ukraine. north korea i am sure gets a lot of things from the russian support, all the ammunition it is providing. rdbut i think what many of us worry about is what else the north koreans are asking for and the russians are considering giving to north korea in return for that.

i would imagine from putin's perspective, there is nothing better than to be able to have this relationship with north korea, which is affecting both the battlefield in europe as well as security on the korean peninsula andy potentially security more broadly in the indo pacific if russia is providing more than simply food and fuel and is providing advanced military technology. this is a very dangerous situation. when i think about areas of improvement, one of the areas that i think we could see more support states and japan, frankly, is you have a korean administration now that is willing to plan on a global scale. it has a president whose focus is foreign policy, not

■■transactionally but also on values, defensive freedom, defensive democracy. very committed to economic security and supply chains, which we will hear from the experts on that in a minute. so i think it is a real opportunity to try to elevate korea to play more of a global role by integrating them into some of not just mini lateral, pleural lateral architectural structures but globally some of the architectures. korea is permanently a member of the nato plus four. my understanding is as long as the biden administration is in, a plus four nato will continue. koreisrently a member of that. the g7 meeting is taking place is italy, and while korea was invited to the hiroshima summit last year, they

are not at the g7 this year. and that seems to me to be a drawback many of the things that g7 leaders are talking about, including economic security, technology, supply chains, global health supply chains, korea is a very important part of that. if we also look at things like the quad, the quadrilateral summit, again, the agenda items and the quad having to do with supply chains, global health, economic security, again, korea is a very important player there, and when we talk about sort of high-end military technology and technological cooperation, japan is now going to be part of it and there is probably a good argument that it could be made for korea also being part. my point is i think things are going very well in terms of the

alliance and trilateral, but there are opportunities where korea can play a more important role. and they seem willing to play a more important role. and two of the key deciders of that are the united states and japan. so i think we should see more encouragement of korea playing those sorts of roles. ellen: thank you. now returning toexperts. under the biden administration, the progresha relatively slow or lacking. so from your perspective, do you think the u.s. and south korea share the same assessment of the justification? if so, where are the differences most pronounced? and also, in what area do you see some alignment for

convergence? >> hi. ok. thank you, ellen, for the question. first of all, i am happy to participate in this panel at csis. it is a very unerring moment. regarding your question, i think the leadership in the two countries share a common understanding on how economic matters are closely linked to national security implications these days. economic security is an agenda. it is noteworthy for korea to have a third director of national security focusing on negative insecurity and science and technology issues since the beginning of this year. and the structural moves in the presidential office in korea definitely provide the framework on how national security

implications definitely should be considered and the whole economic security decision-making process as well. despite the common understanding between korea and the u.s. at a macro mentioned in the question, there are also discrepancies in what is considered at stake, alleged or expected commitments, specifically uneconomic security , which because it requires a lot of consultation with its own private sector as well. i do not necessarily think the overall risk assessment on contingencies in the region for example of the two countries is different, but the weight of the calculation of the present and future economic state, taking certain measures and policies that include things like not only expert controls but also which involved much industrial policies under

countries as well. i think that difference in perception is what could seem to cause a relatively paste progress in the alliance uneconomic security. so for example as already mentioned a lot, korea is considered a strategic partner because of critical factors such as semiconductors and batteries. these have been the backbones of korea's economic growth. the countries have competed on a global front. but under the current envirot of geopolitical turbulence, the criticality of these products has increased to a level of strategic consideration. i think the private sector in korea also cooperated to cope with these costs and inconveniences in the supply chain for supply chain

diversification and compliance issues to meet the government's efforts to pursue security agenda and maintain strong ties in the alliances as well. however, i want to point out that under certain circumstances, the challenges for korea could be intrinsically different from the traditional g7 countries. combining their interests expand capacity for the economic security. which means the calculation can be very different when korea would have to do with immediate costs in the running business with pain to court made with economic security measures for extra controls and proliferation of policies and many other partner countries rather than just the opportunity cost of not rebuilding the industrial capacity as for maybe some other developed westernn that sense ia

would support the u.s. approach of technology protection in the so-called small yard, high fence sort of way. but the concern is if the backyard expands to a broader set of areas and cause significant vulnerabilities in the industry. furthermore, the rise of industrial policy with double-edged incentives can often cause confusion to companies. the guardrail provisions or the rules of origins contents in certain u.s. industrial policies ensure commitment from the ■1participants to a common security vision at the cost of economic efficiency. participating in trade with and investing in the u.s., i think the current companies would want more respect as a trustful and reliable partner with reliability in the business environment.

hover, given how the national security rhetoric is onol , it could\to harm companies. i think clear commitments to alleviate the political lly well balancing the states would achieve further progress in the economic security cooperation. thank you. ellen: thank you for the explanation. thank you. emily? >> can you hear me? ok. thank yo much for inviting me to be here. it is a real pleasure to join the korea chair with the events full of great content. i think your question is a good one that gets at the heart of international cooperation on economic security. very basically put, where do we agree? where do we disagree? how can we move forward to make sure we are building resiliency without inviting very burdensome

costs? so let me start out w agree. and this is on the need to de-risk but not to decouple. key factors. if you are in the washington bubble, all eyes are on china. i think that is disingenuous. there are several other factors leading to this big re-think. some of them are geopolitical in nature like the growing alliance between north korea and russia. others are very practical and physical, like the growing threats of climate change. if you look for example at what has happened to the rhine river the last couple years, it is getting extraordinarily difficult to move goods in europe. the same is acal panama canal, where a lack of water is substantially restraining our ability to conduct international commerce. so what we have at the end of the day is this convergence, this confluence of problems that

is making countries and governments re-think how they can actually build long-term stability. where i think the u.s. stands out a little bit is on the designation of china as primarily a threat and not the customer. i think another area of convergence is on the need to build greater cooperation on anti-coercion. i know dr.■l cha has done a lotf thinking on this issue. what istates although it has been a leader in applying the more restrictive trade toolkit to china has not really had to bear the brunt of a lot of chinese retaliation, unlike other countries like korea or even japan. what is interesting is when china announced restrictions last year which were in response to u.s. export controls and a host of other chip-related investment security mechanism i think we will hear about in the xt couple of days, but china

actually did end up restricting all of the exports to japan, but i never exports to the united states. -- but never restricted exports to the united states. if you project the small fence, high yard, i think the fence is getting taller and they yard is growing, there are costs that you have to pay. the g7 made tremendous strides in standing up the platform but it is time for governments to get to the next level to figure out the framework for when to respond, how to respond, and what would trigger somso among's economies. another area of convergence is that a lot of these policies tend to emanate from executive branches. this is problematic in the long run. we are obviously heading into a historic election cycle. the eu is waking up after

hardship and some of its economies. because a lot of our economic policies are not coming to the legislative impairs our ability to make sure this re-think sticks around in a way that creates greater certainty for our companies and partner governments as well. so where there is pronounced divergence is the u.s. is going further than a lot of the allies and partners on economic security, and they do this in a unilateral way. represents a major departure from the export control regime that has■i provided authority fr a lot of governments to propagate these controls. what we're actually seeing as several european countries have begun to follow through. supplement, spain, the united kingdom, these countries have

taken the first on controls. that is the point of friction for multilateral rules. i thk do a better job of how we can restrain some of the unilateral actions so that each country who ends up participating in this emerging china regime is doing so in a way that is transparent and desired at the end of the day. i think on the expanded toolkit and the united states, there is a backup discussion of, have we seen it all? we have a section 301 update that levied new tariffs on items like semi conductors a few weeks ago but also some clean energy technology like ev's and critical minerals. have we seen the peak economic security doctrine■ emerge from the united states? i don't think we are there at all. there are background discussions right now on whether or not we should contemplate an architecture for combating overcapacity of legacy chips.

i think we can probably see section 232 action also on various parts of the chip su here is levying the new restrictions we force chinese goods into different marketplaces. so if you are the korean economy and you are looking at very pronounced chinese overcapacity of legacy nodes which are embedded in finished products in the united states, and those are more expensive, all of a sudden you and your companies are experiencing an even greater glut. this is a very great opportunity to coordinate allied tariff actions. as we are crafting these new investment tools, to do so together, and i am not sure how to do that. another very substantial area of divergence is on this new idea of pricing in geopolitical risk, interesting thing to watch. if you are familiar with the

carbon border adjustmt mechanism, it levies a tariff architecture on inbound products based on carbon emission intensity of production. there is a new re-think in washington that is emanating in particular from the select committee on thel on the ccp that essentially calls for a pricing it geopolitical risk. some people refer to this a little more simplistically as a maximum-security tax, but the idea is that you backwards engineer your supply chain and you determine to what degree those products are made in a high-risk environment. and if so, whether or not some sort of tariff application or some other remedy may be successful and actually moving the supply chain over the long run. that is a very new discussion. another great opportunity to start having those very concrete discussions with allies and partners. my very last comment is where i think we can go from here. i think we are moving into an era that will be dominated by

supply chains. so one question that has come up a lot in the past year is whether or not the in the pacific economic framework for prosperity could be a blueprint for the future. i am optimistic about certain pillars, but the end, i think the architecture is a little unwieldy, a little big if you look at some of the very successful initiatives of this administration, it has been on the smaller tech alliances that the administration has moved forward. and so if we are looking ahead, it is reasonable to expect we will see a sectorial arrangement at a bilateral or trilateral level. it would require a different level of granular analysis but it makes the work easier because each■ government knows where we need to go from here. ellen: excellent. thank you so much for your very articulate answers. so back to security.

so dr. cha and ambassador lee, there were two meetings recently. korea, japan, had a summit in korea, and the other was at a vice minister level held in washington, here. how do you assess these meetings and their outcomes? was there anything about these meetings, any thoughts? ambassador lee: yeah. korea, japan, u.s. trilateral vice minister level meeting significance was that officially it was the first high-level meeting we actually started

working on institutionalizing trilateral coordination mechanisms. back in the 1990's and early trilateral policy coordination. but that was mostly on north korean issues. but this time, the three countries as they develop a trilateral coordination mechanism, they were talking about fully functioning mechanisms to coordinate in to e three countries. so i think they are taking the trilateral agreement to a mu deeper level. whereas the korea, japan, china trilateral1 cooperation is also kind of a subject of on and off cooperation between the three countries.

sometimes there is a china, japan relation that is not as good as it should be. and we had the problem with the trilateral cooperations. sometimes korea and japan have some issues between the two coun caused some problems to the trilateral cooperation. this korea, japan, japan, china trilateral summit meeting happened in almost 46 years. it is what we regarded as china's reluctance from the beginning and then they later unmoved to china's reservation for korea and japan moving further closer to the u.s. but all of a sudden, i think china also realized the ability to manage the relationship with neighboring countries, which is the major trading partners, korea and japan. inquiry is perspective, it is

also -- in korea's perspective, it is also important because it will host the apex summit next year. premier xi jinping will attend. in that case, in preparation for that meeting, i think china also has the incentive to actively be involved in the trilateral coordination. we are taking advantage of china's desperation. we have this trilateral. we have two trilateral cooperations finally moving together. it is always good for the security and prosperity in thi k follow-up? do you think that these two trilateral meetings are not necessarily mutually exclusive but they are complementary? ambassador lee: yeah. it is not mutually exclusive.

as i said, china is the number one trading partner for korea. japan is also the same. the u.s. is the sole provider of theso economy and security, although there is a growing argument we cannot go back, and we rely on the u.s. for security and rely on china for its market. that area has almost come to an end now, but still, as major trading partners, japan and china, we happen to a recent to maintain the relationship in a much more stable constant, and the u.s. is part of the treaty alliance. ellen: dr. cha? you want me to answer the same question?

understand why korea is very interested in seeing the trilateral with japan and china happen. what he said it has been a longtime since it took place, that trilateral was actually institutionalized in the sense that the trilateral secretariat was e seoul. because probably japan and china would not agree to have a house in either place. and so you have anon but you don't have a meeting. you need to have a meeting. so i can certainly understand why that was needed. of course, the delay was in part due to covid, the covid lucked out, but also geopolitics, tensions. e interest in doing it, and we saw this going back ,

there is a part on the success of the administration efforts consolidating, deepening, broadening the trilateral cooperation. the point you made about institutionalization that we saw with the vice foreign ministers is really important. people really don't appreciate -- as you said, there was once a trilateral institution, but it was entirely focused on scenario planning for north korea. continuously planning. aside from that, every trilateral summit that took place between the leaders of the three democracies in asia, the u.s., japan, and korea, usually on the sidelines of aipac, you and i were both involved in setting these things up, was entirely ad hoc. ad hoc, aren't they? when the three leaders met, it was entirely ad hoc on the

sidelines of something. it was not a dedicated trilateral among the leaders. and so that is why cap david was so important. it really established this. what is the number now? 50 different meetings have taken place at all levels among the three countries on all issues from supply chains and security to the you summit that will take place in of students from japan, while on the one hand the institutionalization of japan, korea, china started much earlier than the u.s., japan, korea, and it has been resumed with the meeting that took place last week or two weeks ago. there is actually much more progress taking place in the trilateral between the u.s., japan, and korea than we have ever seen, and it is outpacing

frankly by leaps and bounds what we are seeing in the japan, china, korea one. somebody also asked me this question and i said that when the vice forei ministers of the u.s., japan, and farm, actiy secretary's farm in virginia -- at the deputy secretary's farm in virginia, i can given to you they are having conversations without talking points and trying to find various deepening of limitation or new areas to create more cooperation. the japan, korea, china trilateral even though it was at a higher level, i guarantee you they were reading talking points and when they finished their talking points, they had a photo op and that was it. it looks good but not very meaningful or deep. that is i think the difference between the two. ellen: thank you. so let's go to the security

panel again. a growing interest in elevating the u.s. alliance into a technology alliance, so where from both of your perspectives do you see the opportunities and limitations? and for the limitations, how do the two countries overcome that? emily: sure. i am happy to kick this one off. i think there is a benefit to pursuing a textbased alliance. i think some of the pitfalls, the analog stuff that is very important, and this is true for medical. it will be true for food, which will be uncomfortable. there will be a lot of cool things that will be mentioned. it is always interesting to focus on the next big thing like quantum or artificial intelligence. we still have a lot of work to do other more traditional trade

portfolio. this is where i am very optimistic about the future of the u.s. alliance. if you look at 2022 bilateral trade, it exceeded $230 billion, which is almost uptick in bilateral trade in goods and services since the implementation in 2012, so if we are looking at this new reality, this very profound we think of global economic engagement, there is no one better situated than two high-performing economies, especially if korea joins the g-7, and are two economies that produce a lot of advanced technology and we already have a trade agreement. i think that is an excellent foundational layer to deeper cooperation. however, for the united states, and i know our colleague just alluded to this, all things go back to export controls and investment screening, and that will probably be true for the future. the united states has no lateral

authority where it can essentially determine that something is so urgent that they can go ahead and preventively control it. the u.s. is waiting for other countries to adopt similar statutory authorities, and my understanding is korea is currently working on adopting something that would afford it greater authority. ■that in turn leads to the other foundational question, which is, do we agree on the merits of controlling something? lot harder to figure out going forward. going back to my earlier commenw what a lot of the risks are. the same is true for artificial but there have been a lot of risks we have not identified yet. it is really hard to predict the take some very tough stress testing among partner governments to figure out what is actually worth controlling. and if you look at the cold war and the years after, there was a very uniform definition of what

a destabilizing accumulation would do to international peace and security. the same is not true for advanced and emerging technologies, so getting those definitions right will be critical and then making sure we can align on investment and trade controls as a foundation for deeper cooperation. all the tangible benefits of permanent inducement side, there is certainly a lot more to be done on cooperatg, so if you look at the deployment of the chips act funding for example, a lot of companies had really good questions about if i sign this agreement to arizona, will i get some support from the government? and rightfully so, i think, which is kind of a complicated thing to explain, the administration's hands were tied. they did not want to get themselves in a situation decidd which chips to invest in. that created a situation where

businesses just did not have a letter of certainty. i think that makes sense on a two to three year time horizon. but if you are looking at a decade or 15 years of technologies, we have to have greater operation on some of the very nitty-gritty implementation whether that is on taxation changes at the state and local level or even on permitting reform. if you look at the chips and science office, there is essentially one person with a very small team who is doing all international engagement work for the chips office. lift. i think we need more staff to carry out those types of engagements moving forward. it is just not reasonable to put this entire agenda on one person in a bilateral context, let alone is trying to build a bigger tech alliance over time. ji yeong yoo: so i would just try to provide a little bit of a historical background in terms

of the science technology relationship between the u.s. and korea. korea and u.s. have been each other's partner through its bilateral agreement since 1992se 1999 and once again recently last year, if you recall what it was meaning to do, it was originally an agreement aiming for an understanding for free exchange of talents and focusing on the opportunity for technology assistance from the u.s. to korea when it was country. but the currently amended version contains more specific provisions, including information sharing, joint research projects, management of intellectual rights as well -- intellectual property rights as well. affects how they have developed over time -- it affects how they have developed over time. as mentioned many times in previous summits, but only

the bilateral dialogue has been the forum to talk about issues, but we have also watched the next generation in emerging critical technology dialogue between the two countries. reading all the joint statements from the summit including the trilateral summit last year, a good portion of the homework that each party should make progress in his in the area of critical and emerging technology. it is possible to deny that it is at the heart of economic security as well. my quick observation of the recent partnerships in the dialogue between the u.s. and its partner countries. the objectives of a more strategic cooperationa rely on three areas. the first one includes the protection of technology, discussing controls, inbound and

outbound investment screening issues. but also the development of technology including joint research projects, information sharing, and exchanges for innovation. and also lastly but not least, establishment of standards, ethics, and regulatory coherence in the area of technology. given these three pillars, when looking at what we have in the partnership between korea and the u.s., we also have developed institutional settings to discuss all three issues. technology ranging from chips to ai to quantum space and nuclear technology as well. but i think there is a lot more in the declaration of the language that how it is actually coming up with the outcomes and results. i think that is the hard part as it was posed in the question. if i may focus a bit on the

korean perspective, i think korea should approach differently for different technologies in ese partnerships, and i think the category of the technologies we can consider is the defense technology, which korea already has some or much of its competitiveness in and can help building a safe technology supply chain that works with the united states. the second would be the emerging technology which korea requires access to and would also want to participate in the development process with the united states. and i think the third category could be things on green energyr a bass application, seeking division of labor with the united states. for each categorical technologies, the government could share technological value chain roadmaps, for example, especially forpec projects, and facilitate policy coordination fcontingencies. at the same time, maybe just

like emily mentioned previously, i think there could be some more efforts to think about agreements in specific technologies. i see a lot of voices talking about those agreements but i rsonally think i need to figure out a bit more on what the contents of these agreements could include and also what kind of commitments we can come up with in these agreements. i personally think these kinds of efforts would also be realized in a multilateral setting since the alliance would not be something confined to a bilateral swap but for an establishment of a sum ecosystem for technology, employment and a reliable and transparent and humanitarian manner. ellen: i have a final question, which goes to everyone. so we have a presidential election here in november, and i

would like to ask all of you to share your election will affect the u.s. and korea alliance going forward in terms of the security, and what area do you expect more attention or even greater cooperation? ambassador? ambassador lee: dr. cha should go first. it is a u.s. election. dr. cha: well, i mean, we really don't know because no matter what anybody tells you, nobody is going to know the results of our election until the date -- until the day after, maybe not even the day after we will not know the results. it is quite unpredictable at this time. i think it is fair to say that on economic securityinuity.

i mean, i think emily mentioned the latest update of section 301. that is something i would have expected to see from the trump administration. we are seeing the biden administration do things like that, so i think there will be quite a bit of continuity there. it will not be perfect good i believe many trump administration officials when they look at what is being done by the biden administration committee actually see ownership policy there because a number of those things, this idea of a multilateral coalition building on some of these things, whether back then it was -- what was it called? the clean network or the blue dot network, these are all efforts by the previous administration to coalesce in

contending with china so i expect to see a lot of similarities there. on china, broadly, there will be a lot of similarities. i guess the two places we might see differences if trump were to win would be on taiwan, where i think president could be totally unpredictable on taiwan. that could go anywhere from strategic ambiguity to strategically ready to selling taiwan down the river frankly. it could be any one of these things. in terms of our alliances, the sort of areas like burden sharing where i expect there will be a lot more pressure on allies to do more, whether we are talking about host nation support bearing more the brunt of the cost for military exercising, these sorts of things. i think there will be major changes there. that is as far as i want to go without getting myself into any trouble. ambassador lee: likewise.

as dr. cha said, there will be, we expect, similarity and continuity and also some changes and challenges. the current government official, we are ready to work with whoever wins the election. the u.s. is our only treaty allies in our most important partners in foreign policy. we are ready and commied to working with whoever occupies the white house this november. ellen: what about the security panelists? emily: i canho exactly what dr. cha was saying about dot, and now the new kid ondard. in the transatlantic context, it started with margaret with the european commission, but there is this idea you can basically implement a new trade barrier

based on whether or not you trust exporter. so i would expect greater continuity on precisely that issue. again, i also would look back to the with 150 recommendations on resetting the agenda. this was a really intensive six-month negotiation with both parts on the hill making serious concessions to the other party about wherthe future of the agenda should head. if you are looking for a guiding document where republicans and democrats can agree on economic engagement, that is really it. i would expect to see that materialize but with a different level of foreign engagement. if you look at the outbound investment screening or the executive order on both data transfers from february or even the connected vehicle rules, this administration went to great lengths to prebrief a lot a expect, how to cooperate, to get a hold of

with any questions, so i think there may be some differences in the rollout of certain strategies, and i think that could materially affect some degree of cooperation. but overall, this is probably one of the more stable aspects of policy that we will continue to see from washington. ji yeong yoo: i also think there will be more of a consistency as a whole in terms of economic and as already dr. victor cha mentioned, there has been an -- a succeeded policy especially in economic issue so i do not think there will be much of a change. but if there is a second term of the trump administration, i also have some concerns there is already rise in the tariff policy arguments.

korea has been struggling from the arguments from the u.s.. that could also rise again if there is a second term. but in those terms come i would also like to mention that it is important that maybe korea's number one exporting cntry has become the u.s. in 2023. that is the first time in 20 years where china is not the number one. so maybe that could also be a signal how has 2d risk and at the same time that can be a consideration that can be considered and the trump -- in the trump administration as well. overall, i have a lot of concerns and worries about high tension geopolitical environment and the issues of economic security. but i also want to hope to maintain optimistic because we will try to cooperate anyway.

dr. cha: i just want to add to one of the points made on trade tensions with allies. i think that is something that would be quite different. i looked the other day. i think every u.s. treaty ally in asia except australia is currently on a trade surplus with the united states. that is something that donald trump cares about. for whatever reason, he cares about merchandise trade surpluses. so i would expect to see a lot of tensionlies. but you know, allies will work with whoever comes in and figure out a strategy to try to address their concerns. ellen: thank you. now we are turning to the audience for questions. if you have any questions, please raise your hand. the mic will go around.

yes, gentlemen up here -- gentleman up here. >> i am peter humphrey, an intelligence analyst and former diplomat. this issue about the united states providing a nuclear blanket to korea concerns me to no end because i see zero circumstance in which we would incinerate a quarter million north koreans. and then on the other side, we have korea saying we cannot develop our own weapon. weincinerate a quarter million north koreans, but we cannot do it without the u.s. helping. it is already extremely thin --r blanket. what is plan b here? i see no opportunity for korea to embrace any sort of nuclear protection.

ellen: maybe we could take a few more questions before our panelists can answer. gentleman over there. >> hello. first time visiting csis. definitely not the last. and a lot of comments being made, there were two points of our strategy that were kind of intention with one another, being a shared commitment to core values but also looking for opportunities to expand our alliance. the question of trilateral relations is one thing, but as we look to the future, which of these do you all believe is probably more important, finding opportunities to und■:■ermine china's growing sphere and making those partners our own, or reinforcing our existing alliance network and that commitment to core values?

yeah. ellen: do you want to take some questions? dr. cha: on the question of the credibility of nuclear deterrence, i think the point of the ncg, the washington declaration, i mean the point of all of this is to deter or preve united states and korea would have to make those sorts of calculations. if you have to make those sorts of calculations, deterrence by definition has failed. so if your question is what is plan b like if deterrence fails, it is entirely context dependent. if north korea starts a second korean war, i think there will be a lot of capability that will be thrown in. maybe not incinerating 22 million people, but is already stated as a part of the overall operational plan that north

said it would nopresident longer continue to exist, so plan a is you deter the best you can, both a conventional war and a nuclear war with a very strong alliance with south korea so that you would never have to go to plan b, and plan b would entirely defend on what north korea did. i think it is fair to say the united states and south korea would not start something. it would be started by north korea and how the two allies responded depends on what the scenario is. on the second question, there will probably be people in the room who would disagree but i do think u.s. alliance strategy in the way that it has continued to be reinforced and strengthened is synonymous with -- the way it

has been reinforced and strengthened in the me democracw a veiled containment strategy. i know there are some -- i am sure there are many from the chinese embassy here who would call it a containment strategy, but i don't after in the building of this framework. even the term latticework, that is the term they use, latticework, experts say it sounds flimsy and weak. i think because the purpose is ot a containment strategy. if it was a containment strategy, they would call at the iron cage, not latticework. is i think all of these policies, economic security and others, security alliances are for the purpose of creating an environment in which the single and most important rising power in the region, the

only one that has the capabilities to be considered not a great power, that they are not able to completely disrupt the rules based order that has been created. they can certainly play a role in shaping it, play a role in helping to make the rules, deviations, revisions to that water, but sort of a unilateral deception or disruption of that order is out of the question. i think many of our strategies are designed to prevent that. if china were no longer coercing others with economic coercion, like they were not doing what they did to korea in 2016 and 2017, or gallium and germanium and graphite and the other sorts of things, i think they would be a lot more room for the united states and cther. but that does not appear to be the direction in which the

currenertherefore, this is a re. we have to remember these things are all responses. they were not created out of the blue. these are responses to development we have seen in the system in the indo pacific. they are reactions to, not preemptive actions for the purpose of containing china, trying to keep it down, so on, and so forth. ellen: so with public session. i would like to thank our chancellor park and the korean national diplomatic academy for the wonderful discussion today. this has been a long day, but thank you so much to all of our panelists for contributing. we will to continue our conversation next year. thank you again. please send a warm round of applause to our panelists.

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